Secret Management
Concept for securely storing, distributing and managing credentials, keys and certificates across distributed systems.
Classification
- ComplexityMedium
- Impact areaTechnical
- Decision typeArchitectural
- Organizational maturityIntermediate
Technical context
Principles & goals
Use cases & scenarios
Compromises
- Compromised management token can expose many resources.
- Misconfigured access policies can lead to overprivilege.
- Insufficient rotation increases dwell time of leaked keys.
- Use short-lived and automatically rotating credentials.
- Implement role-based access control and least-privilege principle.
- Enable comprehensive audit logs and monitor access metrics.
I/O & resources
- Inventory of existing secrets and access paths.
- Organization's roles and access models.
- Integration points (APIs, CI/CD, orchestrators).
- Central secret repository with policies and audit logs.
- Automated rotation and revocation processes.
- Metrics and evidence for compliance audits.
Description
Secret management covers practices and patterns for securely storing, distributing and rotating credentials, keys and certificates in distributed systems. It frames architectural, operational and governance concerns including centralization, access controls and automation. The aim is to reduce leaks, support compliance and ensure reliable handling of secrets in production environments.
✔Benefits
- Reduces risk of credential leaks via centralized control and rotation.
- Facilitates auditability and compliance reporting.
- Improves operational stability through automated processes.
✖Limitations
- Adoption requires integration effort with existing systems.
- Central stores can be single points of failure if not operated highly available.
- Not all legacy applications support dynamic secrets without changes.
Trade-offs
Metrics
- Number of rotated secrets
Measures how many secrets were successfully rotated in a timeframe.
- Mean Time to Rotate (MTTRot)
Average time from detection of compromised secret to rotation.
- Number of accessing entities per secret
Indicates potential overprivilege or secret-sharing.
Examples & implementations
HashiCorp Vault deployment at a payments provider
Central management of API keys and TLS certificates with automated rotation.
Kubernetes secrets with external provider
Storing sensitive data in an external secrets store instead of Kubernetes objects.
CI/CD integration using ephemeral tokens
CI runners receive temporary access tokens for deployment tasks instead of long-lived keys.
Implementation steps
Take inventory of existing secrets and dependencies.
Choose a secret management solution and design the architecture.
Gradually integrate with critical workloads and CI/CD.
Introduce rotation, audit and emergency procedures.
⚠️ Technical debt & bottlenecks
Technical debt
- Hardcoded secrets in legacy apps that are hard to remove.
- Temporary workarounds implemented without long-term rotation.
- Incomplete auditing and missing history of access changes.
Known bottlenecks
Misuse examples
- Storing API keys in plaintext in git repos.
- Manual key rotation without rollback mechanisms.
- Operating central store without high availability and backups.
Typical traps
- Underestimating integration effort for legacy systems.
- Policies that are too restrictive and block automation.
- Lack of monitoring allows undetected misuse.
Required skills
Architectural drivers
Constraints
- • Legacy applications lacking API support for external stores.
- • Regulatory constraints on data storage and transfers.
- • Budget and operational capacity for high availability.